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Consumption Inertia and 
Asymmetric Price Transmission 
 
Tian Xia and Xianghong Li 
 
We propose consumption inertia as a new explanation for asymmetric price transmission. 
Inertia in consumer demand enlarges retailers’ gains in gross profits from raising prices in 
response to higher wholesale prices and reduces gains from decreasing prices in response 
to lower wholesale prices. Thus, consumption inertia can cause asymmetries in price trans-
mission whereby retailers are more willing to change their prices, and change them more 
quickly, in response to wholesale price increases as opposed to wholesale price decreases. 
 





Price transmissions along many agricultural product market chains are asymmetric in that 
input price increases are often more quickly or fully transmitted to output prices than price 
decreases (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Frey and Manera, 2007). Asymmetry of 
price transmission from wholesale to retail markets prevents consumers from enjoying earlier 
and greater reductions in retail prices and prevents wholesalers from benefiting from faster 
and larger increases in retail sales as wholesale prices decrease. Thus, this asymmetry harms 
the interests of both consumers and wholesalers. Some of these effects may be transferred to 
farmers through the procurement of agricultural commodities. Understanding the reasons for 
asymmetric price transmission (APT) can have significant welfare and policy implications. 
  Consumption inertia refers to a gradual adjustment of consumption levels in response to 
retail price changes. The gradual adjustment occurs primarily because of existing consumption 
habits. Specifically, consumption inertia implies consumption changes are smaller in the short 
run than in the long run. We develop a simple conceptual framework to examine the effects of 
consumption inertia on asymmetries in price transmission from wholesale to retail markets. We 
show that this inertia increases retailers’ profits from raising prices in response to wholesale 
price increases and reduces profits from lowering prices in response to wholesale price 
decreases. Hence, consumption inertia can cause asymmetries in price transmission, where 
retailers change their prices faster in response to wholesale price increases than decreases. 
  Consumption inertia can cause faster transmission of wholesale price increases to retail 
markets. This asymmetry has been investigated in previous empirical studies, but appears to 
conflict with theoretical predictions (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Empirical 
studies that find asymmetries in the speed of price transmission provide evidence of 
unidirectional APT; i.e., wholesale or farm price increases are transmitted faster to retail 
markets than price decreases (Kinnucan and Forker, 1987; Frigon, Doyon, and Romain, 1999; 
Peltzman, 2000; Miller and Hayenga, 2001). 
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Asymmetric price transmission occurs primarily in agricultural and food industries. In their 
survey of literature, Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) found that 27 of 40 empirical 
studies on APT investigate agricultural and food markets. Frey and Manera’s (2007) survey 
of 70 studies on the subject confirmed that APT exists widely in agricultural, food, and 
gasoline markets. As reported by Peltzman (2000), in more than two-thirds of examined 
markets, including many agricultural and food markets, output prices rise faster than they fall 
in response to input price changes. Table 1 provides a summary of APT studies on individual 
agricultural and food industries. 
  Imperfect competition offers one explanation for asymmetric price transmission (Bailey 
and Brorsen, 1989; Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert, 1997; Azzam, 1999). Retailers and 
processors with market power may quickly raise output prices in response to input price 
increases to minimize profit losses. However, input price decreases extend profit margins if 
transmitted slowly to output prices. Based on findings of a group of theoretical studies (Barro, 
1972; Blinder, 1982; Reagan and Weitzman, 1982; Ball and Mankiw, 1994; Balke, Brown, 
and Yücel, 1998), APT may result from asymmetry in firms’ adjustment costs with respect to 
increasing or decreasing prices, production levels, and inventory. Several studies (Azzam, 
1999; Fousekis, 2008; Xia, 2009) found that consumer demand and farm supply function 
curvature can cause asymmetries in the magnitude of price transmission from farm or whole-
sale to retail markets. 
  Existing theoretical studies provide ambiguous or conflicting results regarding the 
directionality of price transmission asymmetries. Some results offer explanations for faster or 
more complete transmission of farm or wholesale price increases to the retail level. Other 
results suggest farm or wholesale price increases are transmitted more slowly or less 
completely to the retail level than are price decreases. Levy et al. (2004) consider consumer 
inattention to small price changes as an explanation for asymmetric price adjustment at the 
retail level when input prices remain constant over time.
1 Hence, the existing APT literature is 
inconclusive regarding both causation and direction (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 
2004). 
  We propose consumption inertia as a new explanation for APT. Consumers may form habits 
based on consumption experience, leading to inertia in consumption behavior (Brown, 1952; 
Pollack, 1970; Bonneuil, 1994; Thunström, 2008). Empirical studies report evidence of these 
phenomena in aggregate food consumption (Blanciforti and Green, 1983; Heien and Durham, 
1991; Carrasco, Labeaga, and Lopez-Salido, 2005). Additionally, studies find habit formation 
and consumption inertia for specific agricultural and food products, including meat (Pope, 
Green, and Eales, 1980; Holt and Goodwin, 1997; Karagiannis, Katranidis, and Velentzas, 
2000); dairy (Chintagunta, 1993; Erdem, 1996; Karagiannis and Velentzas, 1997; Arnade, 
Gopinath, and Pick, 2008); fruits and vegetables (Karagiannis and Velentzas, 1997; Stanton, 
2007); and breakfast cereal (Thunström, 2008). Table 1 identifies industries in which APT 
exists and markets for which consumption inertia exists. The two lists show that APT can 
exist in an industry when consumption inertia is present, suggesting a possible link between 
the two market phenomena.   
                                                 
1 Levy et al. show that consumers may rationally ignore small retail price changes in order to avoid the costs of processing and 
reacting to new price information. Consumer inattention can explain why small price increases occur more frequently than small 
price decreases at the retail level. Xia and Li  Consumption Inertia and Asymmetric Price Transmission   211 
 
Table 1. Industries with Asymmetric Price Transmission, Markets with Consumption 
Inertia, and Corresponding Studies 
Asymmetric Price Transmission  Consumption Inertia 
Industries    Studies   Markets    Studies  
1. Meat Products  
 (cattle/beef,  pork, 
 chicken/broilers) 
Bailey & Brorsen (1989); Hahn 
(1990); Appel (1992); Bernard & 
Willet (1996); von Cramon-
Taubadel (1998); Goodwin & 
Harper (2000); Miller & Hayenga 
(2001) 
1. Meat Products 
 (beef,  pork, 
 chicken,  turkey, 
 mutton/lamb) 
Pope, Green & Eales (1980); Holt 
& Goodwin (1997); Karagiannis, 
Katranidis & Velentzas (2000) 
2. Dairy Products 
 (milk,  butter, 
  cheese, ice cream) 
Kinnucan & Forker (1987); 
Frigon, Doyon & Romain (1999); 
Chavas & Mehta (2004); Carman 
& Sexton (2005) 
2. Dairy Products 
 (milk,  butter, 
 cheese,  yogurt) 
Chintagunta (1993); Erdem 
(1996); Karagiannis & Velentzas 
(1997); Arnade, Gopinath & Pick 
(2008) 
3. Vegetables and 
 Fruits 
Ward (1982); Pick, Karrenbrock & 
Carman (1990); Willett, Hansmire 
& Bernard (1997); Richards & 
Patterson (2003) 
3. Vegetables and 
 Fruits 
Karagiannis & Velentzas (1997); 
Stanton (2007) 
4. Other: 
  ■ Peanuts 
  ■ Maize 
 
■ Zhang, Fletcher & Carley (1995) 
■ Abdulai (2000) 
4. Other: 
  ■ Breakfast Cereal 
  ■ Aggregate Food 
 
■ Thunström (2008) 
■ Blanciforti & Green (1983); 
   Heien & Durham (1991); 
   Carrasco, Labeaga & Lopez- 
   Salido (2005) 
 
 
The Model Structure 
 
Food retailers likely possess some market power because of spatial and store differentiation 
and high concentration in local markets. To facilitate exposition, we consider a model in 
which local retailers are able to set retail product prices similar to monopolistic behavior.
2 
Such products could include agricultural products such as fresh fruits and vegetables or food 
products. Demand for the product offered by a retailer is represented by a general function, 
(1)           () , Qf P   with  0. f <   
The retailer procures the product from a competitive wholesale market, so that the wholesale 
price w is given.
3 We assume an initial stable wholesale price w0 in m ≥ 2 periods before 
period 1.
 4    
                                                 
2 Focusing on the case of monopoly does not imply that consumers cannot shop at a different store or there is no competition 
among retailers in a specific retail market. Due to high store and spatial differentiation among retailers, this monopoly assumption 
posits that the customer base of a food retailer is comprised primarily of individuals who live within close proximity and have 
committed ex ante to do regular grocery shopping in the store(s) of this retailer. For example, Slade (1995) finds most food retailers 
act as local monopolists in retail markets. The results from this model are robust to oligopoly retailers. 
3 Previous studies (Phlips, 1980; Azzam, 1999) have shown that the existence or nonexistence of market power in the wholesale 
market has implications for whether price transmission is complete or incomplete, but not for whether price transmission is sym-
metric or asymmetric. For information about the impact of market power on the completeness (or degree) of price transmission, see 
McCorriston, Morgan, and Rayner (1998, 2001). 
4 The purpose of specifying the wholesale prices, retail prices, and quantities in two or more periods (m ≥ 2) before a wholesale 
price change is to provide the necessary model structure for consumption inertia. In the case of consumption inertia in this model, 
consumers’ experience in at least two periods before period 1 is needed to determine consumers’ habit in period 1, when a retail 
price change could occur. 212   August 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
  At the beginning of period 1, we consider a wholesale price increase to  10 ww
    or 
decrease to  10, ww
    where  0 (0, ) w  and subscript t = 1, 2, ... denotes the tth period 
since the wholesale price change. This wholesale price change in period 1 can be temporary 
with a probability  (0,1)   or permanent with a probability 1− θ.
5 If temporary,
 the whole-
sale price will return to its initial level w0 in period 2 and stay at that level in subsequent 
periods of the retailer’s planning horizon. If the change is permanent, the wholesale price in 
all subsequent periods of the planning horizon will include the change. 
  A retail price is set at the beginning of each time period, and the retailer’s planning horizon 
is from period 1 to T. The retailer has a binary decision to make in each period in response to 
this wholesale price change. In period 1, she can either change her price or keep it unchanged 
based on the expected returns of the two choices. Period 2 reveals whether the wholesale 
price change is temporary or permanent. The retailer decides whether or not to change her 
price in period 2 and subsequent periods based on this information. 
  The retailer incurs a constant average and marginal variable selling cost, c. Without loss of 
generality, we set c = 0 to facilitate exposition. The profit-maximizing retail price is the 
solution of P for ()( ) 0 . fP P wf   
6 We denote this solution as a function g(w) with g' > 0. 
In each of the m periods before the wholesale price change, the equilibrium retail price, 
quantity, and profit are 00 () , P gw  00 () , Qf P  and 00 0 0 () , P wQ   respectively. The retailer 
incurs a repricing cost S > 0 for each price change. Repricing costs are assumed to be sym-
metric for price increases and decreases.
7 
 
The Market Without Consumption Inertia 
 
We use markets for which consumption adjusts instantly to price changes as a benchmark to 
evaluate consumption inertia effects on price transmission. For the benchmark, consumption 
in the short run and the long run in response to a retail price change is represented by the same 
function [equation (1)]. Suppose the wholesale price increases to 1 w
 in period 1. We solve the 
model backwards to find the retailer’s optimal price choices. 
 
Price Choices in Periods [2, ] tT   
First, we analyze the retailer’s price choices in period 2 and subsequent periods assuming 
retail price was unchanged at P0 in period 1. If the wholesale price change is temporary and 
the price returns to w0 in period 2, the retailer’s optimal choice is to continue charging P0 and 
receive a per period profit π0 in period 2 and subsequent periods.   
                                                 
5 We make this distinction in order to capture the fact that some wholesale price changes are caused by fundamental changes in 
the technology and costs of agricultural production, processing, and wholesaling, as well as market structure in farm markets, while 
other wholesale price changes are due to temporary fluctuations in the factors related to farm and wholesale markets. 
6 In this model, the retailer is assumed to choose a price to maximize her profit for this product under study, and the coordina-
tion of pricing strategies across multiple products in a store is not included. This assumption is standard in the literature on price 
transmission and retail pricing behavior (e.g., Azzam, 1999; Levy et al., 2004; Villas-Boas, 2007). We acknowledge the possible 
restrictiveness imposed by this assumption. Future research may be able to examine how relaxing this assumption affects the price 
transmission analysis. 
7 Repricing costs are a form of adjustment costs. Studies have shown that asymmetry of firms’ adjustment costs with respect to 
increasing or decreasing price, production, and inventory may cause asymmetries in price transmission. Xia and Li  Consumption Inertia and Asymmetric Price Transmission   213 
 
  If the wholesale price change is permanent, the retailer has two choices. First, a retailer 
could continue to charge price 0, P which would yield a per period profit of  00 u Q
    , 
where subscript u indicates the retail price is unchanged at 0. P The present value (period 1 










     
where  1( 1 ) , 0     is the discount rate, and subscript i denotes the case when the retail 
price is unchanged at 0 P in periods 1 and 2. 
  Second, a retailer could also raise her price and incur a repricing cost S in period 2 and 
receive per period profits  op
   for periods  [2, ]. tT   When the wholesale price is  0 w , 
the  retailer’s optimal per period profit is 0 () , op op op Pw Q
      where 0 () op Pg w
   , 
() , op op Qf P
   and the subscript op denotes the optimal value. The present value of the total 











       
where subscript ii denotes the case when the retail price is unchanged at 0 P in period 1 and 
then changed in period 2. 
 Comparing  and ii i
   reveals that when the retail price is unchanged in period 1 and the 
wholesale price change is permanent in period 2, the retailer will continue charging 0 P in 
period 2 and subsequent periods if (0, ]. i
   However, the retailer will raise her price 
to  op P
 in period 2 and subsequent periods if . i
   A detailed specification of  i
   is given in 
appendix A. 
  We also analyze the retailer’s price choices in period 2 and subsequent periods, assuming 
retail price was immediately raised to op P
  in period 1. If the wholesale price change is 
revealed to be temporary, the retailer will reduce the price in period 2 to 0, P incur repricing 
cost S, and receive profit  0   in period 2 and subsequent periods. The present value of the 











     
If the wholesale price is permanent, however, the retailer will keep the price at  op P
  and 
receive a per period profit  op
   for period 2 and subsequent periods. For this situation, the 










    
Price Choices in Period 1 
The choice to not change price from 0 P or immediately raise it to op P
  must be made prior to 
knowing if the wholesale price change is temporary or permanent. Based on the price choice 
in period 2 and subsequent periods, we obtain the expected returns for the two price choices 
in period 1. If the retailer keeps the price unchanged at 0 P in period 1, the present value of 























   
 
   

              




where the subscript delay indicates that a retailer does not change price in period 1 while 
delaying her final price response to period 2, at which time she would know if the wholesale 
price change is temporary or permanent. Alternatively, if the retailer immediately raises her 
price to  op P












   


        
   
where the subscript iii denotes the case in which retail price is immediately changed in period 1 
in response to a wholesale price change. Comparing  delay
  and  , iii
  we find that the retailer 
will not change price in period 1 if  , ii
   or will immediately raise her price if  ii
   and 
0. ii i
    
  In summary, a retailer must decide in each period whether or not to change her price in 
response to a wholesale price increase. The retailer will immediately raise her price in period 
1 when the wholesale price increase of α is large () . ii
    The retailer will not change her 
price in period 1 when the wholesale price increase is small () . ii
    If the wholesale price 
increase is very small(0 ), i
  the retailer will always keep her price unchanged in period 
2 and subsequent periods. When the wholesale price increase is moderate () , ii i
      the 
retailer will raise her price in period 2 if the wholesale price increase is revealed to be 
permanent, or will continue to keep her price unchanged in period 2 and subsequent periods if 




We also analyze retailer responses to a wholesale price decrease (appendix A). The 
boundaries of the magnitude (α) for a wholesale price decrease are and . ii i
    We find 
0, ii i
     , ii
   and ii ii
  (appendix A).
8 As the results of  ii
    and ii ii
   
show, for equal increments and decrements in the wholesale price, retail price responses are 
almost identical. Thus, the wholesale-retail price transmission is nearly symmetric in the 
absence of consumption inertia. 
 
The Consumption Inertia Model 
 
Consumption inertia is present when consumer habits cause gradual changes in consumption 
levels in response to retail price changes. Thus, consumption changes are smaller in the short 
run than in the long run. In our model, the short run is less than or equal to one period. We 
                                                 
8 Note: and i i ii ii
        when the retailer’s per period profit is a quadratic or linear function of the wholesale price (see 
appendix A for additional discussion). Xia and Li  Consumption Inertia and Asymmetric Price Transmission   215 
 
assume consumers’ habits in period t are based on consumption experiences in the two 
previous periods, t – 1 and t −2.
9 In period t, consumers’ habits can be represented by 
,, [, ] , min t max t QQ  where  ,1 2 Min{ ( ), ( )} min t t t Qf P f P    and  ,1 2 Max{ ( ), ( )}. max t t t Qf P f P  
10 
When consumption inertia exists, retail demand for the product in period t is represented as: 
(2)       












tm i n t tt m i n t
tt tm i n tm a x t
tt m a x t tm a x t
fP Q Qk f P k Q
Qf P f P Q Q
Qk f P k Q fP Q
   
          






where k  ˆ (1 ) kk measures the difference between consumption changes in the short run 
and those in the long run, deviations from consumption habits must be greater than δ (δ > 0) 
to trigger a consumption inertia effect.
11 These two parameters provide a measure of con-
sumption inertia strength. Figure 1 illustrates the retail demand specified in equation (2), 
assuming consumers make smaller consumption changes in the short run than in the long run 
if a retail price change causes significant deviation (> δ) from the consumers’ habit range. 
  For example, if retail price increases in period t to Pt and satisfies   , , tm i n t fP Q    this 
new retail price will lead to a consumption level Qt that deviates more than δ units from the 
consumers’ habit range  ,, [, ] . min t max t QQ Then consumption inertia exists. Thus, the short-run 
reduction in consumption, 1 , tt QQ   is smaller than the long-run reduction, 11 tt QQ   , 
assuming the retail price remains at t P in period t + 1. 
  If a retail price change causes only a small (or zero) deviation from consumers’ habits, 
Qt =  ,, ()[ , ] , tm i n t m a x t fP Q Q     consumers adjust quickly so that the short-run and long-
run consumption changes are similar. We use equation (2) to recognize that consumers make 
small adjustments in their consumption levels quickly, but relatively large adjustments are 
usually more costly and take longer to complete. 
  We now investigate retail price responses to wholesale price changes when consumption 
inertia exists by solving the model backwards. The approach assumes that the wholesale price 
increases by α to  1 w
 in period 1. 
 
Price Choices in Periods [2, ] tT   
We first examine retail price choices in period 2 and subsequent periods conditional on an 
unchanged retail price of  0 P in period 1. The beginning of period 2 reveals whether the 
wholesale price change is temporary or permanent. If the wholesale price change is 
temporary, the retailer’s optimal choice is to keep the retail price at 0 P in period 2 and sub-
sequent periods. A consumption inertia effect will not be triggered because the retail price 
remains unchanged in all periods.   
                                                 
9 Consumption inertia effects on APT in this model are robust to other settings when consumers’ habits are based on a longer 
consumption experience. 
10 In period t, consumers can fully adjust their consumption levels in response to retail prices 12 (a n d) tt PP   in the two previous 
periods based on the consumer demand function Q = f
 (P). 
11Consumptions changes in the short run are smaller than in the long run when consumption inertia is present (k is less than 1). 
We assume  ˆ kk   in order to focus on the case of price transmission from wholesale to retail markets, where  ˆˆ (0 ) kk   is the value 
of k that satisfies  0 () () , a n d () ci ci ww w
   is the retailer’s profit in one period when a retail price increase triggers a consumption 
inertia effect. If ˆ, kk  the retailer has incentive to adjust her price even if the wholesale price remains constant. This phenomenon 
























Figure 1. Consumer demand when consumption inertia exists 
 
  If the wholesale price change is permanent, the retailer faces two price choices. First, if the 
retail price remains at  0 P in period 2 and subsequent periods, total profit for periods  [2, ] tT   










     
Second, the retailer can also raise her price and incur a repricing cost S in period 2. This price 
increase will trigger a consumption inertia effect in period 2 when
  11
00 [( ) ] g fQ w     .
12 
We use the demand function in (2) to obtain market equilibrium in period 2 as: 
00 () ( ) ( ) ( 1) / 0 , ci ci fP P w f Q k k
         quantity is 0 () ( 1) ( ) ci ci Qk f P k Q
     , profit 
is 0 () , ci ci ci Pw Q
      and the subscript ci denotes that a consumption inertia effect is 
triggered. In period 3, consumers can fully adjust to the retail price change in period 2, 
resulting in a new habit range of 0 [ ( ), ( )]. ci fP fP
 The optimal profit under the consumer 
demand function  () Qf P   is  op
   and  0 [( ) , ( ) ] . op ci Qf P f P
      Thus, the consumption 
inertia effect disappears. The retailer sets her price at  op P
 and receives a per period profit  op
   












       
  
                                                 
12 It is optimal for the retailer to keep her price unchanged in all periods when 
11
00 [( ) ] g fQ w
      (appendix A).  
()  Qf P
  Demand with consumption inertia 
Q 
 P  
a  b  b 
a: Consumption in the current period is within or deviates a small amount (≤ δ) from the 
consumers’ habit range. Consumption adjustments complete quickly. 
b: Consumption in the current period deviates a large amount (> δ) from the consumers’ 
habit range. A consumption inertia effect is triggered. Xia and Li  Consumption Inertia and Asymmetric Price Transmission   217 
 
Comparing and ii i
  shows that a retailer will keep the price at 0 P in period 2 and subse-
quent periods if  (0, ], i
   or raise her price to ci P
 in period 2 and set the price at op P
 in 
subsequent periods if  i
   (appendix A). 
  We analyze the retailer’s price choices in period 2 and subsequent periods conditional on 
the retailer immediately raising her price to  ci P
 in period 1. This retail price increase in 
period 1 triggers a consumption inertia effect when
11
00 [( ) ] . g fQ w
    Again, the 
consumption inertia effect disappears in period 2. If the wholesale price change is shown to 
be temporary in period 2, the retailer will reduce her price back to 0 P with a repricing cost and 
receive a per period profit  0  in period 2 and subsequent periods. The present value of total 











     
If period 2 reveals the wholesale price change to be permanent, the retailer will set the price 
at 
+
op P and receive a per period profit  +
op   for period 2 and subsequent periods. The present 











     
Price Choices in Period 1 
In period 1, the retailer chooses between keeping the price unchanged at 0 P and raising the 
price immediately to ci P
 based on the relative magnitudes of the expected returns from these 
two choices. From the analysis of the retailer’s price choices in period 2 and subsequent 
periods, we find the present value of the expected total net profit for the planning horizon of 
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  
              
     
Relative values of  and delay iii
  show that the retailer’s optimal choice in period 1 is to 
keep the price unchanged at 0 P if , ii
   or to raise her price immediately if  ii
  (appen- 
dix A). 
 
Effects on APT 
 
We also analyze the retailer’s price choices for wholesale price decreases when consumption 
inertia exists (appendix A). The boundaries of the magnitude (α) of a wholesale price 218   August 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
decrease for the retailer to have different price responses are and , ii i
    such that 
0, ii i
     , ii
   and  ii ii
  (appendix A). 
  Based on these results, we examine price transmission in markets with consumption 
inertia. We compare the boundaries (a n d) ii i
     of α for wholesale price increases with 
those (a n d) ii i
   for wholesale price decreases. The results  and i i ii ii
        show that 
the retailer’s optimal price choices in response to a wholesale price increase and an equal 
wholesale price decrease are asymmetric when the magnitudes of wholesale price changes 
belong to (, )(, ) . ii i ii i
      These asymmetries are attributable only to consumption 
inertia based on the comparison of the market with consumption inertia and the benchmark 
case. Proposition 1 summarizes the results. 
■ P ROPOSITION 1. Consumption inertia can cause asymmetries in price transmission 
from wholesale to retail markets when seller power exists in retail markets. For whole-
sale price changes at some moderate levels [( ,) ( ,) ] , i i ii ii
         consumption 
inertia causes the following asymmetries: 
 ( i)  Retail prices rise immediately in response to a wholesale price increase while 
their response to an equal wholesale price decrease is slower, or 
 ( ii)  Retail prices rise in response to a wholesale price increase while retail prices 
remain unchanged following an equal wholesale price decrease. 
  The intuition behind the results in proposition 1 is straightforward. Consumers reduce 
consumption levels gradually in response to a retail price increase when consumption inertia 
exists, but adjust instantly after a retail price increase when there is no consumption inertia. 
So, raising retail price causes a smaller consumption reduction in the short run for the case of 
consumption inertia than for the benchmark case. Thus, increasing retail price in response to 
an increase in wholesale price raises retail profit when consumption inertia exists relative to 
the benchmark case () . ci u op u
       On the other hand, consumers also gradually 
increase consumption levels in response to a retail price reduction when consumption inertia 
exists. A lower retail price leads to a smaller sales increase in the short run for the case of 
consumption inertia relative to the benchmark case. Lower retail prices will therefore reduce 
retail profits when consumption inertia exists relative to markets where it does not 
() . ci u op u
       These two opposite consumption inertia effects on gross profit lead to 
the asymmetries in wholesale-retail price transmission listed in proposition 1. 
  We can also express the results in terms of different hurdle rates for raising and lowering 
retail prices in response to wholesale price changes. Two boundaries and three magnitude 
ranges exist for wholesale price changes. For example, and ii i
    are the two boundaries that 
define three ranges of wholesale price increases when consumption inertia exists. One option 
of retail price responses exists for each range. First, if a wholesale price change is large, a 
retailer will immediately change her price. Second, if a wholesale price change is very small, 
a retailer will not change her price. Third, if a wholesale price change is neither small nor 
large, a retailer will not change her price, wait to discern whether the wholesale price change 
is permanent or temporary, and then make her final price response. 
  When consumption inertia exists, the two boundaries (or hurdle rates) where the option is 
exercised are different depending on whether the wholesale price increases or decreases. 
Relatively small wholesale price increases (low hurdle rates) can cause a retailer to 
immediately raise her price; but relatively large wholesale price decreases (high hurdle rates) Xia and Li  Consumption Inertia and Asymmetric Price Transmission   219 
 
are needed to induce a retailer to immediately reduce her price. This outcome provides 
structure for empirical tests of the effects of consumption inertia on APT. Rather than using 
distributed lag structures to determine asymmetric differences and speeds of adjustment, one 
can measure differences in retailer hurdle rates as a test for APT. 
  The strength of consumption inertia can affect the range of wholesale price changes that 
are asymmetrically transmitted to retail prices. Proposition 2 characterizes this relationship 
(the proof is provided in appendix B). 
■ P ROPOSITION 2. A stronger consumption inertia effect, represented by a smaller k or 
δ, leads to a wider range (, )(, ) i i ii ii
     of wholesale price changes that are 
asymmetrically transmitted to retail markets.
13  
  Stronger consumption inertia allows retailers to increase retail prices in response to whole-
sale price increases and generate higher profits. In addition, profits are declining less as 
retailers lower prices more slowly in response to wholesale price decreases. Thus, smaller 
wholesale price increases can cause a retailer to instantly raise her price, but larger wholesale 
price decreases can induce a retailer to instantly lower her price. Therefore, the range of 
wholesale price changes that are transmitted asymmetrically to retail markets becomes wider. 
  Propositions 1 and 2 provide empirical structure for explaining APT behavior. The first 
empirical issue is that researchers should measure or test for asymmetries in price 
transmission separately for different levels (magnitudes) of input price changes when the 
main cause of APT is consumption inertia. Studies using conventional irreversible demand 
functions (Houck, 1977; Ward, 1982) and cointegration techniques (von Cramon-Taubadel 
and Fahlbusch, 1994) treat all magnitudes of input price changes as though they transmit 
identically (symmetrically or asymmetrically) to output prices in the empirical estimation. In 
studies that use threshold error correction models (e.g., Goodwin and Holt, 1999), input price 
changes that are smaller than a specific threshold level may not lead to output price responses, 
but input price changes that exceed a threshold level are assumed to transmit identically to 
output prices. 
  Our model shows: (a) large input price changes are symmetrically transmitted, (b) small 
input price changes cause no responses in output prices, and (c) only moderate input price 
changes can be asymmetrically transmitted. Empirical tests that assume identical transmission 
of all magnitudes of input price changes may underestimate the degree of asymmetries in 
price transmission or incorrectly conclude that symmetric transmission occurs. Estimating 
and testing APT separately for different magnitudes of input price changes can improve 
empirical analyses of APT. 
  The second empirical implication is that APT patterns should be clearer when stronger 
consumption inertia effects exist. For example, the consumption of addictive substances such 
as tobacco and alcoholic products exhibits strong consumption inertia effects that can lead to 
significant asymmetries in price transmission. Although a significant amount of research has 
been conducted on consumption inertia in markets of addictive substances (e.g., Becker, 
Grossman, and Murphy, 1994; Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan, 1998), almost no studies 
focus on asymmetries in price transmission along the market chain of these addictive 
products.  
                                                 
13 Based on equation (2), the smaller k or δ, the smaller the consumption change that consumers will make in the short run after 




Simulation results shown in figure 2 illustrate asymmetries in price transmission under 
different levels of consumption inertia effects. We use empirical data and previous research 
results to model the strength of consumption inertia. Some studies (Heien and Durham, 1991; 
Karagiannis, Katranidis, and Velentzas, 2000; Carrasco, Labeaga, and Lopez-Salido, 2005) 
show that the ratios of short-run to long-run demand elasticity for various meat products 
(beef, pork, chicken, and mutton) and aggregate food consumption fall between 0.70 and 
0.89. Based on the model specification in equation (2), the ratio of short-run to long-run 
demand elasticity is approximately equal to the value of k, a parameter indicating the strength 
of consumption inertia. Thus, k varies from 0.70 to 0.89 in the simulation to represent various 
levels of consumption inertia in agricultural and food markets. 
  The simulation specifies functional forms and parameter values based on industry char-
acteristics. We use a quadratic function
2 ( ) 50 624 Qf PP P    for consumer demand. 
The initial wholesale price level is  0 10. w   The value of θ is 0.5, indicating that probabilities 
for a wholesale price change to be temporary or permanent are the same. Given that retail 
prices of agricultural and food products are usually set every week, the value of ρ is probably 
very close to 1; we therefore set ρ = 0.95. The number of time periods in the planning horizon 
is T = 4 based on the condition T ≥ 3 in the conceptual model. In the conceptual model, δ is 
small relative to the consumers’ habit range, and S is chosen whereby all three price responses 
are relevant. Thus, we specify δ = 3 and S = 10 in the simulation. 
  We use the analytical results in our conceptual model to calculate values of ,, ii ii
  , 
and ii
  in the simulation analysis. We calculate the probability of an immediate retail price 
increase (decrease) in response to a wholesale price increase (decrease) when the magnitude 
of a wholesale price change is uniformly distributed over the interval  0 [0, ]. w  Figure 2 illus-
trates that as consumption inertia increases (as k decreases from 0.89 to 0.70), a retailer is 
more likely to immediately raise her price in response to a wholesale price increase and less 
likely to immediately reduce her price when the wholesale price falls. Figure 2 also shows 
that the range of asymmetric wholesale price changes transmitted to retail markets becomes 




Asymmetric price transmission (APT) exists in many agricultural and food industries and can 
have significant welfare and policy implications. However, mechanisms driving this market 
phenomenon are not thoroughly understood. This paper suggests consumption inertia explains 
APT behavior. Consumption inertia makes instantly raising retail prices attractive for retailers 
with market power when wholesale prices increase because consumers will not significantly 
reduce their consumption levels in the short run. On the other hand, retailers are less willing 
to lower prices (and tend to lower them more slowly) in response to wholesale price decreases 
when consumption inertia exists because of relatively inelastic consumer responses in the 
short run. Therefore, consumption inertia leads to faster transmission of wholesale price 
increases to the retail level relative to wholesale price decreases. Our findings also reveal that 
stronger consumption inertia leads to asymmetries in price transmission over a wider range of 
wholesale price changes. The results can be applied to various industries because consump-
tion habits exist for many goods. Consumption inertia can therefore help us understand why 











    Figure 2. Asymmetric price transmission under various consumption inertia 
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  Probability of an immediate retail price increase (decrease) 
   
   in response to a wholesale price increase (decrease) 
0.89 
Notes: The probability of an immediate retail price increase (or decrease) in response to a wholesale price 
increase (or decrease) is calculated as  00 1/ ( o r 1/ ) ii ii ww
   when the magnitude (α) of a wholesale price 
change is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, w0]. The width in panel B is the one of (, )(, ) . ii i i i i
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  The consumption inertia explanation for APT complements other explanations proposed in 
the literature (e.g., imperfect competition and asymmetry of adjustment costs). Which factor 
explains the greatest portion of APT in any specific market chain is an empirical question. We 
are not aware of an all-encompassing model that can measure the APT effects of all the 
factors that have been proposed—imperfect competition, asymmetry of adjustment costs, and 
consumption inertia. However, such a model would be useful in empirical studies on 
asymmetric price transmission and is a topic worthy of future research. 
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Derivations of the Retailer’s Optimal Choices 
 
The Market Without Consumption Inertia 
 
■  A Wholesale Price Increase 
Comparing the two present values,  and , ii i
   yields: 
(A.1)                 
1 () 1 1 0 .
Τ
ii i i op u HS
               
We define 
1(0), ii H
   where 
1() i H
   is the inverse function of  () . i H   Then we obtain 
(A.2)           () 1 2 0 iii delay ii op u HS
                  when   ii i
     
and define
1(0), ii ii H
  where
1() ii H
  is the inverse function of () . ii H   
  Using the envelope theorem, we find 
(A.3)                     
1
0 () 1 1 0
Τ
io p HQ Q
             
and 
(A.4)           0 () 0 . ii op HQ Q
        
  In real industry practice, retail prices may remain unchanged for a short time before changing in response 
to a wholesale price change. We find the condition 
(A.5)                      10      
can ensure all four conditions: (1) () () ii i HH   for the scenario of a wholesale price increase in the bench- 
mark, (2) () () ii i JJ  for the scenario of a wholesale price decrease in the benchmark, (3) () () ii i VV  for 
the scenario of a wholesale price increase in the market with consumption inertia, and (4) () () ii i ZZ  for 
the scenario of a wholesale price decrease in the market with consumption inertia. The four conditions can 
guarantee the possibility that it is optimal for the retailer to first keep the price unchanged in period 1 and 
then change her price in period 2 in the four corresponding scenarios. We therefore assume that (A.5) holds. 
Using equations (A.1)–(A.5), we obtain  . ii i
     
 
■  A Wholesale Price Decrease 
 
If the wholesale price decreases to 10 ww
   in period 1, the present values yielded by two price choices 




=a n d = ,
TT
tt
iu i i o p
tt
S
   

        
where 00 u Q
    and 0 () op op op P wQ
      with 0 () op Pg w
   and () . op op Qf P
  We obtain 
(A.6)                  
1 () 1 1 0
Τ
ii i i op u JS





  is the inverse function of () . i J  The present values of the expected 
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We compare them to find: 
(A.7)         () 1 2 0 iii delay ii op u JS
                when   ii i
     
and define 
1(0), ii ii J
   where 
1() ii J
   is the inverse function of () . ii J   
  Applying the envelope theorem yields 
(A.8)                       
1
0 () 1 1 0
Τ
io p JQ Q
            
and 
(A.9)               0 () 0 . ii op JQ Q
        
Based on equations (A.5)–(A.9), we obtain  . ii i
     
  We now compare i
  and ii
  with i
  and . ii
  The retailer’s per period profit is a function of the 
wholesale price, i.e., ( ) [() ](() ) . P wQ gw w f gw     We use the second-order Taylor approximation to 
obtain: 
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           
 
  
Using (A.10), (A.11), and the formulae for and , uu
    we find . op u op u
       Based on this condition, 
(A.1), (A.2), (A.6), and (A.7), we obtain and . i i ii ii
       When the retailer’s per period profit is a 
quadratic or linear function of the wholesale price, the second-order Taylor series are equal to the values 
of  00 () a n d () op op ww ww
        so that we have  ii
     and  . ii ii
     
 
The Market with Consumption Inertia 
■  A Wholesale Price Increase 
Comparing the two present values,  and , ii i
    yields: 
(A.12)                 
1 () 1 1 0 .
Τ
ii i i ci u op u VS
                  





   where 
1() i V
   is the inverse function of  () . i V   We also obtain 
(A.13)          () 1 1 0 iii delay ii ci u op u VS
                            when  ii i
   
and define
1(0), ii ii V
  where 
1() ii V
   is the inverse function of  () . ii V   We find 
(A.14)                   
1
00 () 1 0
Τ
ic i o p VQ Q Q Q
              
and 
(A.15)                 00 () 1 0 ii ci op VQ Q Q Q
                
due to  00 and . ci op QQ Q Q
   Using equations (A.5) and (A.12)–(A.15), we obtain . ii i
     
  The definition of consumption inertia requires δ to be a relatively small number. Specifically, we set 
00 Min{ ( ), ( ) } op i op i QQ Q Q
       to facilitate exposition. (Although some specific analytical 
solutions are different in the other case when δ is small but  00 Min{ ( ), ( ) } op i op i QQ Q Q
       , 
the qualitative results about consumption inertia effects on APT remain the same.) If 11
00 [( ) ] g fQ w     , 
the retailer can raise her price to the optimal level op P
  without triggering a consumption inertia effect. So, 
the analysis returns to the benchmark case. Using  00 Min{ ( ), ( ) }, op i op i QQ Q Q
       we obtain 
g
−1[ 1
00 () ] . i fQ w
      Based on the benchmark case results, the retailer will not change her price in all 
periods when  11
00 [( ) ] . g fQ w      
 
■  A Wholesale Price Decrease 
 
If the wholesale price decreases to  10 ww
   in period 1, we find that retail price changes can trigger 
consumption inertia effects in Γ periods if  11
00 [ ( )], wgfQ      where Γ is the largest integer that 
satisfies , ci op QQ

  and the subscript ci,
 τ denotes the τ
 th period when a consumption inertia effect is triggered 
with  [1, ].    We set  [1, 2] Τ    to facilitate exposition. The results about consumption inertia effects do 
not change when 2. T   Then we find that ,1 ci P
  is equal to the smaller one of two values:  1
0 () fQ    and 
the solution of P for   00 () ( ) ( 1 ) / 0 , fP Pw f Q k k      and ,1 ,1 0 () ( 1 ) ( ) . ci ci Qk f P k Q
    If 
2 ≤ τ ≤ Γ, , ci P

 is equal to the smaller one of two values: 1
,1 [( ) ] ci ff P
 
   and the solution of P for 
f (P) + (P − 0, 1 )[ ( ) ] ( 1 ) /0 , ci wf f P k k

       and   ,, , 1 () 1 [ ( ) ] . ci ci ci Qk f P k f P
 
        
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where  ,, 0 , () . ci ci ci Pw Q
 
      We find 
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  is the inverse function of () . i Z  The present values of the expected 
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Based on these two present values, we find 
(A.17)    
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1(0), ii ii Z
   where 
1() ii Z
   is the inverse function of  () . ii Z   We also obtain 
(A.18)          () 0 i Z     
and 
(A.19)          () 0 ii Z     
due to  ,0 0 and . ci op QQ Q Q

   Using equations (A.5) and (A.16)–(A.19), we find  . ii i
     
 If  11
00 [( ) ] , wgfQ     the retailer can lower her price to the optimal level op P
 without triggering a 
consumption inertia effect. Thus, the analysis returns to the benchmark case. Using  0 Min{ ( ) op i QQ
     , 
0 () } op i QQ
   and , ii
   we obtain 11
00 [( ) . i wgfQ
      So, the retailer will keep her price at 
P0 in all periods. 
  We now compare  and with and . ii i ii i
     We use  
         00 0 1, ci op op op op op kf P k Q P w f P P w
                     
         ,1 ,1 0 ,1 0 ,1 ,1 0 1, ci ci ci ci ci op kf P k Q P w f P P w
                    
and  
           ,, , 1 , 0 , , 0 1 ci ci ci ci ci ci op k f P k f P Pw f PPw
     
                     
for 2 ≤ τ ≤ Γ to obtain  () () ii i i VZ
      and  () () . ii ii ii ii VZ




Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Based on the definition of , i
  we have ()0 . ii V
   Using the implicit function theorem and the envelope 
theorem yields: 
   
    00 0
ii i i i i
ci ci i i i
kd V d k d V d
Qf P P w d Vd
  
 
            
              
 
and 
   
    0 10 .
ii i i i i
ci i i i
dV d dV d
kP w d V d
  
 
            
      
 
Similarly, using the definitions of ,, a n d, ii i ii
   the implicit function theorem, and the envelope theorem, 
we  obtain  0, i k
      0, i
     0, ii k
    0, ii
     0, ii k
   and  0. ii
    Therefore, 
the range(, )(, ) i i ii ii
    is wider when k or δ is smaller.    